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COMMENTS
THE STATUS OF PRIVATE SEARCHES UNDER THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION
OF 1974
In Burdeau v. McDowell,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment limits governmental action only and does
not prohibit searches 2 by private persons. The court stated, "[The fourth
amendment's] origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a
restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended
to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies . . . ."I Thus
a private search, unless conducted because of government participation,
instigation, or encouragement, 4 does not constitute a "search" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment.5
In interpreting the search and seizure provisions of their respective
state constitutions, the courts of most states have followed Burdeau, 6
and, until recently, it was clear that Louisiana followed this approach
as well. As interpreted by the state's courts, the Louisiana constitutions
through the Constitution of 1921 did not prohibit private party searches. 7
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574 (1921).
2. Search shall be used throughout this paper to refer to both search and seizures.
3. 256 U.S. at 475, 41 S. Ct. at 576.
4. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); United States
v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
5. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
6. 1 W. Lafave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on Search and Seizure § 1.6, at
113.
7. A search and seizure provision first appeared in the Louisiana constitution in
article 108 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1864. The provision, identical to the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution, remained unchanged until article 1, section
5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. See La. Const. Title I, art. 9 (1868); La. Const.
art. 2 (1879); La. Const. art. 7 (1898); La. Const. art. 7 (1913); La. Const. art. I § 7
(1921) (slight rewording). In State v. Renard, 50 La. Ann. 662, 23 So. 894 (1898), an
inmate gave an incriminating letter to a trustee who turned it over to authorities. The
court rejected a fourth amendment claim. The court held: "[Tlhe trusty violated defendant's
confidence, by reading [the letter] and placing it in the possession of an officer of the
law, who proposed to put it in evidence against him. That was simply the misfortune of
the defendant, who was overconfident of the trustworthiness of his messenger. There is
surely nothing unlawful in this .... 50 La. Ann. at 655, 23 So. at 895. The court did
not address the state constitution; however, it is fair to assume that since the two provisions
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The same may not be true under the Constitution of 1974. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has suggested, but has never clearly held, that private
party searches are prohibited under article 1, section 5 of that consti-
tution.' The courts of appeal, on the other hand, have held that that
article does not apply to such searches. 9 The purpose of this comment
is to review issues Louisiana courts have thus far treated as searches
and seizures by private persons under article 1, section 5 and, further,
to suggest how the supreme court should ultimately resolve this issue.
This article is divided into four sections. First, the text and legislative
history of article 1, section 5 will be examined. Second, the jurisprudence
interpreting article 1, section 5 will be explored. Third, an overview of
the approaches that other jurisdictions have taken to the issue of the
constitutionality of private searches will be presented. Finally, the merits
of extending article 1, section 5 to private searches will be examined in
light of the various policies that underlie the section and the social
benefits and costs that such an extension is likely to entail.
In exploring whether article 1, section 5 applies to some particular
class of actors such as private parties, one cannot avoid adverting to
the difficult problem of the nature of the relationship between that
section and the exclusionary rule. This rule is inevitably in the back-
ground of any debate that concerns whether to expand or contract the
scope of search and seizure provisions. Determining precisely how the
section and the exclusionary sanction are interrelated is, however, beyond
the scope of this comment. For the purposes of this comment, it will
be assumed that article 1, section 5 contains an implicit exclusionary
rule and, further, that any evidence obtained in violation of the section
must be excluded at trial. The exclusionary rule, of course, provides
that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights
may not be admitted at trial. The exclusionary rule has come under
great attack since its inception, 0 but no effective alternative has been
offered." As the Supreme Court has stated, without this rule the fourth
were identical, the fourth amendment interpretation applied to the state constitution also.
State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, vacated, 423 U.S. 809, 96 S. Ct. 20 (1975), on remand,
330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976) held that article I, section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1921 did not prohibit private party searches.
8. State v. Hutchinson, 349 So. 2d 1252 (La. 1977).
9. State v. Coleman, 466 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 467 So. 2d
542 (1985); State v. Clark, 454 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 456 So. 2d
1012 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 49-57.
10. W. Lafave, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 22.
11. Id. § 1.2, at 30-31. Suggestions for replacing the exclusionary rule include tort
actions and administrative sanctions. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
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amendment would be no more than "a form of words." 1 2 This prop-
osition applies with equal force to article 1, section 5. At any rate, the
application of the exclusionary rule is not being considered here; rather,
the focus of this comment is on the extent of the right to be free from
unreasonable searches.
THE TEXT AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Article 1, section 5 reads as follows:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, commu-
nications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall
issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose for the search.
Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted
in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its
illegality in the appropriate court.' 3
The language of this section does not indicate that state action is
a necessary condition for the application of the section's protections.
The "invasions of privacy" clause in the first sentence, which makes
no distinction based on the identity of the searcher, is the only part of
the section that might support a prohibition of private party searches.
The emphasis of the clause is on the privacy in general, not merely
privacy vis-a-vis the government. The last sentence, which deals with
standing and exclusion of evidence, does not include an "invasions of
privacy" clause; it refers only to persons adversely affected by a "search
or seizure." This phrase arguably implies police or government action,
for one does not normally refer to intrusions by private actors as searches
or seizures. Thus, this sentence may indicate that the section requires
403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971) (imposing tort liability for violations of the fourth
amendment by federal agents). These have proved to be ineffective. Tort actions would
allow the government to pay for violations of the right. The right is affirmative. Gov-
ernment should not be allowed to violate the right with public funds, W. Lafave, supra
note 6, § 1.2, at 33. Additionally, bringing a tort action takes time and money. Many
people do not have the necessary time or money; neither are they aware that the right
exists. Officers' conduct in violating the Fourth Amendment will often be a violation of
a criminal law. However, prosecutors are very reluctant to bring criminal charges against
law enforcement officials. Administrative sanctions are notoriously ineffective. The police
are not equipped to police themselves. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations:
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1401 (1981).
12. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
13. La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
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exclusion of evidence only if that evidence is obtained through a search
and seizure conducted by a state officer.1 4
The section provides that each person shall be secure against un-
reasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. If the section's
primary purpose is to guarantee the right of the person to be secure,
then the identity of the actor should be irrelevant. The literal wording
of a constitutional provision, however, does not always reflect its true
meaning. The fourth amendment is similarly worded, 5 yet it does not
prohibit private searches. 16 In order to arrive at a proper interpretation
of article 1, section 5, it is therefore necessary to examine the history
of article 1, section 5, as reflected in the debates at the constitutional
convention and in the subsequent writings of some of the participants
in those debates.
In the only debate at the Constitutional Convention of 1973 ad-
dressing the issue of private party searches, Mr. Schmitt pointed out
that, given the terminology of the section, it might protect a person
from private as well as state action.' 7 He noted with apparent disapproval
that under prior law the police could use incriminating evidence that
had been illegally obtained by a private detective.' Building upon Mr.
Schmitt's comments, Professor Lee Hargrave, coordinator of legal re-
search for the Convention, subsequently wrote, "Supporting this con-
clusion is the first sentence of the section which seems to provide an
affirmative right of every individual and not just a check on state
action."' 9 On the other hand, Professor Hargrave was careful to note
that such a far-reaching change may not have been intended. The debate
was not focused on this issue, and the committee representatives did
not address this point.
Several years after the Convention, Representative Woody Jenkins,
co-author of the Declaration of Rights, wrote, "The section is intended
to apply solely to government action, in accord with the view of the
14. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1974).
15. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue; but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
16. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
17. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Transcripts, Vol.
VI, August 31, 1973 at 1076.
18. Id.
19. Hargrave, supra note 14, at 23.
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committee that a bill of rights cannot reach private action." 20 Responding
to Mr. Schmitt's assertion, Representative Jenkins stated that evidence
obtained illegally by private persons does not result from a "search or
seizure in violation of this section" because the section prohibits only
state action.2' He also stated, however, that "[tihe use of such evidence
by the state is prohibited because it makes citizens less secure in their
persons, communications, papers, and effects." ' 22 In other words, the
section's guarantee that "[e]very person shall be secure" would be
compromised if evidence obtained by otherwise illegal private searches
could be admitted into evidence. 23 Thus while the section itself does not
make private party searches illegal, it does prohibit the use of evidence
obtained by private parties in violation of other laws.
As the above discussion reveals, neither the language of article 1,
section 5 nor its history provides an answer to the question whether
the section applies to searches by private parties. The text of article 1,
section 5 permits, but does not require, such an interpretation. The
delegates at the Constitutional Convention did not extensively debate
this question and although several commentators who have written since
the constitution's ratification have recognized the possibility of applying
article 1, section 5 to private actors, they have not provided a definitive
answer to the question. Because the text and history of the section are
indeterminate, the courts have been left to their own devices in resolving
the issue. As will be shown in the next section, the courts have reached
contradictory results.
LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE
The Louisiana courts have treated private party searches inconsis-
tently since the Constitutional Convention of 1973. Although the supreme
court commented in several early decisions that article 1, section 5
prohibits private party searches, those statements were dicta; the court
has never addressed the issue directly. At least one court of appeal,
following this dicta, has held that private searches are unconstitutional.
Recently, however, the courts of appeal have almost universally reached
the opposite conclusion. This section will describe the various positions
taken by the courts and will attempt to determine the current status of
the law of private party searches in Louisiana.
20. Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 9, 28 (1975).





Private Party Searches Held Reasonable
The issue of the applicability of article 1, section 5 to private searches
was first raised in State v. Hutchinson.24 A store owner whose premises
had been robbed searched the exterior of the defendant's van after the
police arrived, but without their permission. The defendant contended
that the search was unreasonable and proscribed by the Louisiana con-
stitution. 25 Writing for the majority, Justice Dennis 26 stated, "We are
unwilling to hold that the rights safeguarded by article 1, section 5 of
our constitution are merely coextensive with those protected by the
Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution, or that private searches
and seizure are not within the ambit of protection afforded by out state
charter. '27 Because the store owner did not enter the interior of the
van, however, the court found that the search was not unreasonable.
Since Hutchinson, a number of Louisiana courts have remarked that
article 1, section 5 may prohibit unreasonable searches by private persons,
but they have avoided deciding the issue by finding that the private
searches at issue were reasonable. 28 This generalization applies to a
number of supreme court opinions, the most recent of which is State
v. Gentry.29 Applying the principles developed in Hutchinson, the court
found that the search in question, an examination of a shipped package
by a common carrier, was reasonable. Since the search was reasonable,
the court concluded, the carrier's actions did not violate the provisions
of the Louisiana Constitution and the evidence was properly admitted.30
Similar reasoning led the second circuit to uphold the private search
at issue in Allen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.3 There, a security guard
conducted a search pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
24. 349 So. 2d 1252 (La. 1977).
25. Id. at 1254.
26. As a delegate to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, Justice Dennis
would have been privy to any discussions of article 1, section 5 and the extent to which
it should apply.
27. 349 So. 2d 1252, 1254.
28. State v. Gentry, 462 So. 2d 624 (La. 1985); State v. McCabe, 383 So. 2d 380
(La. 1980); State v. Abram, 353 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1977), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 934, 99
S. Ct. 2058 (1979); State v. Sanchez, 516 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ
denied, 523 So. 2d 1334 (1988); State v. Furino, 451 So. 2d 1139 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 456 So. 2d 1017 (La. 1984); State v. Polk, 482 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 483 So. 2d 1023 (1986).
29. 462 So. 2d 624 (La. 1985).
30. Id. at 629.
31. 409 So. 2d 1268 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd, 412 So. 2d 1095 (1982). The supreme
court reversed for a new trial on the merits. In Allen, a customer activated the store
detection system with a tag from another store. The customer sued for tort damages.
The claim was that Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 215 was unconstitutional
in light of article 1, section 5, which prohibits private searches.
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article 215.32 The person searched then brought a tort suit against the
merchant. Issuing what may be the clearest judicial pronouncement
regarding the private searches issue to date, the court, citing an earlier
supreme court decision,33 interpreted article 1, section 5 as prohibiting
"unreasonable searches by anyone, whether private persons or police." ' a4
This statement, however, was pure dictum; like the supreme court in
Hutchinson and Gentry, the court ultimately found the search reasonable.
Although the state's appellate courts, following the supreme court's
lead, have found numerous private searches reasonable, none of the
courts has given a great deal of attention to the standard for gauging
the reasonableness of such searches. With some exceptions," warrantless
searches by police officers are presumed to be unreasonable;3 6 this pre-
sumption may, of course, be rebutted. In determining whether private
party searches are reasonable, the courts have relied on some of the
same factors that they ordinarily use to determine whether warrantless
police searches are reasonable. These factors include the defendant's
subjective expectation of privacy, the reasonableness of that expectation,
the reasonableness of the suspicion that provoked the initial search,37
and whether the person conducting the search has a superior right.3"
Beyond mentioning these factors in a few of its discussions, the courts
have offered little guidance in this area.
Private Party Searches Held to Violate Article 1, Section 5
State v. Nelson39 represents the first case in which a Louisiana court
found that a private search was unreasonable and violated article 1,
section 5. Private security guards handcuffed, choked, and strip-searched
a person they suspected of stealing a diamond ring. Although no ring
32. For the text of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 215, see infra note
40.
33. 409 So. 2d at 1274 (citing State v. Nelson, 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978)).
34. Id.
35. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973) (consent); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (good faith exception); Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (inevitable discovery); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971) (impeachment exception); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966) (exigent circumstances); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967) (hot pursuit or emergency exception); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969) (search incident to an arrest); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925) (automobile exception).
36. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980); United
States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
37. State v. Sanchez, 516 So. 2d 415, 419 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 523
So. 2d 1334 (1988).
38. State v. McCabe, 383 So. 2d 380, 383 (La. 1980).
39. 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978).
1989]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
was ever found, the defendant made an inculpatory statement in the
course of the search. He then sought to suppress the statement arguing
that it was the fruit of an illegal search. Because the security guards
acted pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article 215, 40 which allows
merchants to detain shoplifters, the court could have found that the
search constituted state action and that the state action which resulted
in the statement was unreasonable.4' The statement also could have been
excluded on the ground that it was obtained by force and thus was
involuntary; such inculpatory statements are inadmissible regardless of
who obtains them. 42 But Justice Tate, writing for the majority, stated,
"We instead prefer to rest our ruling . . . on the unreasonableness of
the [illegal] search by private persons. ' 43 The court based its conclusion
on the fact that "[tihe introductory section of Article I, Declaration of
Rights, declares that the rights enumerated by it (which include the
prohibition against unreasonable searches) are 'inalienable by the state
and shall be preserved inviolate by the state."'"4
The supreme court followed Nelson in the later case of State v.
Longlois.4 5 In that case a wildlife agent made an arrest for possession
of marijuana, a misdemeanor. Since a wildlife agent is not authorized
to make arrests for possession of marijuana 46 and a citizen's arrest is
not authorized for a misdemeanor,47 the actions of the wildlife agent
could only be considered those of a private person. The court nevertheless
found the actions of the wildlife agent to be an unreasonable seizure
for the purposes of article 1, section 5.48 In support of this conclusion,
the court cited the traditional rationale for the exclusionary rule, namely,
the need to deter illegal conduct. Although the court treated the search
in question as private, it was in reality an unauthorized search by an
officer of the state. Given the tone of the opinion, it seems that the
court was more concerned about state officers unreasonably exceeding
40. La. Code Crim. P. art. 215(A)(l) provides:
A peace officer, merchant, or a specifically authorized employee of a merchant,
may use reasonable force to detain a person for questioning on the merchant's
premises, for a length of time, not to exceed sixty minutes, unless it is reasonable
under the circumstances that the person be detained longer ....
41. 354 So. 2d at 542.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting La. Const. art. I, § 1).
45. 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979).
46. Id. at 1210 (citing La. R.S. 56:108, repealed by 1985 La. Acts No. 876, § 4,
eff. July 23, 1985).
47. Id. (citing La. Code Crim. P. art. 214 which states, "A private person may make
an arrest when the person arrested has committed a felony, whether in or out of his
presence.").
48. Id. at 1211.
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their lawful authority than about private intrusions upon individual
privacy. The court's application of the exclusionary rule in Longlois
evidently was aimed at deterring overreaching by such officers in the
future.
Article 1, Section 5 Held Not to Prohibit Private Party Searches
While the supreme court has consistently refused to exclude evidence
obtained by private party searches by finding the searches reasonable,
the courts of appeal have gone a step further and have held that article
1, section 5 does not prohibit such searches. In State v. Clark,49 the
third circuit was faced with a private search that could not be found
reasonable. A landowner stopped poachers on his neighbor's land and
confiscated their weapons and the deer that they had illegally killed.
Since the offense was only a misdemeanor, a citizen's arrest was not
authorized. 0 Further, the landowner had no superior right to or interest
in the land simply because it belonged to his neighbor. Noting that the
deterrence of illegal conduct is the primary rationale of the exclusionary
rule, the court reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule to private
searches would not serve the purpose behind the rule; a private person,
unlike a state law enforcement official, has no incentive to secure ev-
idence for use in court. The court allowed the evidence to be admitted,
saying, "It is our opinion that Article 1, section 5 does not create an
exclusionary rule applicable to the conduct of private citizens." 51 The
court distinguished Nelson and Longlois on the ground that in those
cases the challenged action was taken "under color of state law" and
therefore constituted state action.
In State v. Coleman,5 2 the second circuit held that article 1, section
5 does not require the exclusion of evidence that is obtained with a
search warrant where the warrant is issued on the basis of information
discovered as a result of a search by a private person. A neighbor who
was to take care of the defendant's house while the defendant was on
vacation found pornographic materials in the defendant's bedroom closet.
The neighbor went to the police, who then obtained a search warrant.
According to the court, "LSA-Const. Art. 1, Sec. 5 permits use of
evidence obtained from some purely private searches to procure an
otherwise valid search warrant, even if the private search is found, or
assumed, unreasonable." 53
49. 454 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 456 So. 2d 1012 (1984).
50. Id. at 236. See supra note 47 for the text of La. Code Crim. P. art 214.
51. Id.
52. 466 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 467 So. 2d 524 (1985).
53. Id. at 72. The second circuit reaffirmed this position in State v. Cann, 494 So.
2d 1263 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 501 So. 2d 228 (1987). There the court
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The holding in Coleman is much more limited than that in Clark.
Coleman is in many ways analogous to those decisions in which the
supreme court has interpreted the "adversely affected" clause.5 4 Under
that clause, a defendant may complain if the police violated someone
else's constitutional rights in obtaining evidence that will be used directly
against the defendant. 5 However, he cannot raise the issue, if the police
merely use such evidence to secure a search warrant.5 6 In the latter
situation, the warrant "cures" the original violation, which is considered
to be too remote to justify the exclusionary sanction. Nevertheless, in
the latter situation article 1, section 5 still operates to protect the person
subjected to the original search, that is, the person whose rights were
violated can object to the admission of the evidence obtained under the
warrant should the state attempt to introduce it against him. Under the
holding of Coleman, however, if the search was conducted by a private
party rather than by the police, then the person is not protected even
if the evidence obtained under the warrant is to be used directly against
him.
The other courts of appeal have also held that private party searches
are outside the scope of article 1, section 5.17 Moreover, in at least one
case, the supreme court itself has allowed the admission of evidence
that was obtained by an unreasonable private party search. In State v.
McCabe,8 the defendant was drunk and creating a disturbance. A neigh-
bor, fearing for the safety of his children, looked into the defendant's
truck and, upon discovering a pistol and drugs, confiscated them. The
dismissed a claim that a private search was a violation of the exclusionary rule in one
sentence. "We find that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to
suppress." 494 So. 2d at 1266 (citing State v. Gentry, 462 So. 2d 624 (La. 1985)).
54. The "adversely affected" clause of article 1, section 5 provides, "Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have
standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court."
55. State v. Herbert, 351 So. 2d 434 (La. 1977); State v. Williams, 489 So. 2d 286
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
56. State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1976).
57. In State v. Jones, 526 So. 2d 1374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) the first circuit
appears to have decided that private searches are not prohibited by article 1, section 5.
The defendant displayed suspicious activity in a hotel room. The employees monitored
defendant's activities, especially the number of phone calls. Based on this information as
well as other information gained from surveillance, officers obtained a search warrant.
Defendant claimed that the evidence should be suppressed because his privacy was invaded.
The court dismissed this and went on to say in dicta that "the rule requiring the suppression
of evidence illegally seized was intended to restrain governmental authorities, not private
individuals." However, thereafter the court discusses the reasonableness of the employees
activities. It should also be noted that the search was conducted pursuant to a search
warrant. The private search, if any, led to the warrant. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text.
58. 383 So. 2d 380 (La. 1980).
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supreme court held that even though the search was unreasonable,
evidence obtained by a private person is admissible where a superior
right or interest attaches to the individual conducting the search at that
time or place.5 9 Because the neighbor's interest in protecting his children
was superior to the defendant's privacy interest in the truck, the court
reasoned, the evidence was properly admitted. Thus, if article 1, section
5 does prohibit private party searches, McCabe establishes that there is
at least this one exception.
Summary
In Hutchinson the supreme court, after adverting to the possibility
that article 1, section 5 prohibits private searches, nevertheless upheld
the private search in question there by finding that it was reasonable.
The supreme court has continued to treat private searches in this manner
up through the Gentry case. If the court has not accepted the view that
article 1, section 5 prohibits private party searches, then its discussion
in the cases of the reasonableness of the searches was pointless. Although
the courts generally avoid constitutional interpretation whenever possible,
the number of cases in which the supreme court has taken pains to
evaluate the reasonableness of private searches suggests more than a
simple adherence to canons of constitutional interpretation. By discussing
the reasonableness of the private search each time the issue presents
itself, the court has tacitly affirmed that article 1, section 5 does prohibit
unreasonable searches by private persons.6
On the other hand, the fact that the supreme court has never found
a private search unreasonable unless the person responsible was in some
way acting under state authority may suggest that article 1, section 5
does not prohibit purely private searches, that is, searches conducted
by actors who can in no way be considered state agents. A purely private
setting may suggest that article 1, section 5 does not prohibit private
searches. Nelson and Longlois are the only two cases which might be
construed to be examples of the exclusion of evidence procured by a
private search; however, both cases arguably involved state action. In
Longlois, the state, through a law enforcement officer, conducted the
search. Nelson involved security guards acting pursuant to a statute.
The result in result Nelson could also be justified on due process grounds.
The kind of incredibly unreasonable search involved in that case "shocks
59. Id. at 383.
60. The supreme court has recognized that its decisions have not settled the issue.
In State v. Wilkerson, 367 So. 2d 319 (La. 1979), the actions of an off-duty deputy
sheriff were held to be state action. The court stated in dictum, "This court has yet to
decide whether Article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution bans unreasonable searches
by private citizens as well as police." 367 So. 2d at 321.
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the conscience," ' 61 and arguably ought to be prohibited regardless of the
identity of the actor.
The courts of appeal appear to have reached a tentative consensus
that private searches are not prohibited by article 1, section 5. The
second and third circuit courts of appeal have gone beyond the holdings
of the supreme court to declare that article 1, section 5 does not apply
to any private search, regardless of its unreasonableness. 62 The first and
fourth circuits, though somewhat more cautious, have also recently
declared that the Louisiana Constitution does not proscribe private
searches. 63 The implication of these appellate decisions is that evidence
,from purely private searches will be admitted as evidence except in those
extreme cases that shock the conscience. These cases cite the supreme
court's decision in State v. Gentry as authority. The court in Gentry,
however, did not hold that the Louisiana Constitution does not prohibit
private searches; rather, it found the private search to be reasonable.
The courts of appeal have apparently interpreted the reluctance of the
supreme court to find these searches unreasonable as meaning that private
searches are not proscribed by the Louisiana Constitution.
Clearly, the rulings of the courts of appeal are in conflict with the
dicta of the supreme court's decisions. Ultimately, the supreme court
will have to face the issue squarely and put this conflict to rest. When
the court chooses to do so, it may wish to consider how other states
have resolved the question of the constitutionality of private party searches.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Twenty states have adopted state constitutional prohibitions against
unreasonable search and seizure that track the wording of the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution.6 4 In the constitutions of
61. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 162, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952).
62. State v. Cann, 494 So. 2d 1263 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 501 So.
2d 228 (1987); State v. Coleman, 466 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 467
So. 2d 524 (1985); and State v. Clark, 454 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
456 So. 2d 1012 (1984).
63. State v. Sanchez, 516 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 523 So.
2d 1334 (1988) (holding search to be reasonable); State v. Polk, 482 So. 2d 21 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 483 So. 2d 1023 (1986) (holding private search reasonable). The
first and fourth circuits then followed the second and third circuits in holding that article
1, section 5 does not prohibit private searches. Allen v. Louisiana State Board of Dentistry,
531 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); State v. Jones, 526 So. 2d 1374 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1988).
64. Ark. Const. art. II, § 15; Cal. Const. art. I, § 13; Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, 13;
Haw. Const. art. I, § 7; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17; Ind. Const. art. I, § 11; Iowa Const.
art. I, § 8; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; Miss. Const. art. III, § 23; Neb. Const. art. I,
§ 7; Nev. Const. art. I, § 18; N.J. Const. art. I, 7; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12; N.D.
Const. art. I, § 8; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 11; Utah Const. art. I, § 14; Wis. Const. art.
I, § 11; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4.
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another sixteen states, the search and seizure provisions vary only su-
perficially from the fourth amendment; one typical change is the sub-
stitution of "property" or "possessions" in the place of "effects.'' 65
Since most state constitutional provisions concerning unreasonable
search and seizure are very close paraphrases of the fourth amendment,
most state courts not surprisingly have concluded that their respective
state provisions afford individuals no more protection than does the
fourth amendment. Nevertheless, the courts of several states have ruled
that their state prohibitions require the exclusion of evidence obtained
by private security guards through unreasonable methods. Only Montana
has experimented with extending its state search and seizure provision
to evidence obtained by purely private searches.
Decisions Holding Private Searches Not Covered
Most state courts have concluded that the search and seizure pro-
visions of their state constitutions are coextensive with the fourth amend-
ment. 66 State v. Watts,67 a case out of Utah, involved the actions of a
police informant. The Utah Supreme Court held, "Article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the fourth amend-
ment, and thus this Court has never drawn any distinctions between
the protections afforded by the respective constitutional provisions. ' 68
In State v. Killebrew,69 a Tennessee case, a relative gave incriminating
letters to the police. As authority for rejecting defendant's claim that
the search violated both the fourth amendment and the state constitu-
tional provision, the Tennessee court cited Burdeau v. McDowell.7"
The courts of several other states have likewise concluded that their
state search and seizure provisions duplicate the fourth amendment, but
for different reasons. Instead of simply following the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment, they have
considered the policies behind search and seizure provisions and the
exclusionary rule. In State v. Smith,7 the Kansas Supreme Court reached
65. Alaska Const. art. I, § 22; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7; Conn. Const. art. I, § 7;
Del. Const. art. 1, § 6; Fla. Const. art. I, § 12; I11. Const. art. I, § 6; Kan. Bill of
Rights § 15; Ky. Const. § 10; Me. Const. art. I, § 5; Mo. Const. art. I, § 15; Ohio
Const. art. I, § 14; Okla. Const. art. II, § 30; Or. Const. art. I, § 9; Pa. Const. art.
I, § 8; R.I. Const. art. I, § 6; S.C. Const. art. I, § 10; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9; W.
Va. Const. art. III, § 6.
66. See Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Cases of Evidence Obtained by Searches
by Private Individuals, 36 A.L.R.3d 553 (1971).
67. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988).
68. Id. at 1221.
69. 760 S.W.2d 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
70. 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574 (1921).
71. 763 P.2d 632 (Kan. 1988).
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the same conclusion as the United States Supreme Court regarding private
party searches, but grounded its reasoning in the policies underlying the
exclusionary rule. There a trash collector who had entered a house
through an open door to investigate an unusual hissing noise stumbled
on marijuana while turning off a running faucet. The court held that
section 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights does not apply to private party
searches. According to the court, the purpose of the state's exclusionary
rule, which the court regarded as an integral component of section 15,
is to deter official misconduct. Because applying the exclusionary rule
to private persons would have no effect on private behavior, the court
concluded that "the conduct of a private person acting independently
and not under the authority or direction of the State is not included
in the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution or section 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights." 7 2
The above decisions illustrate how most state courts have resolved
the private party search issue. Many courts simply cite Burdeau v.
McDowell as conclusive authority for the proposition that constitutional
provisions governing search and seizure apply only to governmental
actors. Further, of those that have considered whether the policies un-
derlying the exclusionary rule would be promoted by applying the rule
in the private search context, the majority of the courts have answered
the question in the negative.
Exceptions for Private Law Enforcement Personnel
The courts of several jurisdictions have considered the issue of private
searches in the narrow context of the actions of privately employed
security guards. In People v. Zelinski,73 the California Supreme Court
held that evidence obtained through a search by a private security guard
that exceeds statutorily authorized limits must be excluded from evidence.
Although the court acknowledged that state action must be involved for
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to apply, it
found that the quasi-law enforcement activities of security guards con-
stitute state action. The court stated:
[The search] was nevertheless an integral part of the exercise of
sovereignty allowed by the state to private citizens. In arresting
the offender, the store employees were utilizing the coercive
power of the state to further a state interest. Had the security
guards sought only the vindication of the merchant's private
interest they would have simply exercised self-help and demanded
the return of the merchandise. Upon satisfaction of the mer-
72. Id. at 638.
73. 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979).
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chant's interest, the offender would have been released. By
searching her, they went beyond their employer's interest. 74
Because no state official was directly involved in the search at issue in
Zelinski, the court's ruling in that case represents a significant leap from
those of prior decisions in which the court had found state action. In
making this leap, the court was apparently influenced by the threat
posed to individual privacy posed by the increasing use of private security
personnel. The court noted that the private security sector employs more
people and is growing at a faster rate than public law enforcement.75
The approach adopted by the California court in Zelinski is similar
to that taken by the United States Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmunson
Oil.'6 In Lugar, the Court held that the actions of a private person who
acts pursuant to a procedural scheme created by statute becomes state
action. Similarly, since a California statute in Zelinski authorized the
private security guards to act, those actions were converted into state
action. Of course, if a search involves state action, then the issue is
easy to resolve: all courts agree that the exclusionary rules which emanate
from the search and seizure provisions of the state and federal consti-
tutions prohibit the use of evidence obtained by unreasonable state
searches.77
After Zelinski, the California voters amended their constitution by
referendum. The relevant section now reads, "Except as provided by
statute hereafter enacted . . . relevant evidence shall not be excluded in
any criminal proceeding .. ."78 The California courts have interpreted
this amendment as overruling Zelinski.'9
Zelinski, though abandoned in the state of its origin, has had
considerable influence in several other states. West Virginia is one ex-
ample. In State v. Muegge,80 a private security guard conducted a search
of a shopper's pockets and found $10.65 worth of stolen items. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that because the security
guard was acting pursuant to statutory authority,"' she should be con-
sidered an agent of the state and, as such, her powers were limited by
the state constitution. 2 The court cited the increasing role of private
security forces in law enforcement in justification of its decision.
74. Id. at 367, 594 P.2d at 1006, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
75. Id., 594 P.2d at 1005, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
76. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948).
77. This is the approach advocated by Representative Jenkins. See supra text accom-
panying notes 20-23.
78. Cal. Const. art. 1, § 28(d).
79. People v. Geary, 173 Cal. App. 3d 904, 219 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1985).
80. 360 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1987).
81. West Virginia has a shoplifter detention statute similar to that of Louisiana. See
W. Va. Code § 61-3A-4 (1984).




The Montana Constitution is relatively modern and in many ways
similar to the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. In State v. Helfrich,3
the Montana Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the
search and seizure provision of its constitution, article II, section 10,84
prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained in an unreasonable private
party search. In that case, a private citizen had entered her neighbor's
garden and had taken some plants later identified as marijuana. The
court concluded that article II, section 11 bars the admission of evidence
obtained in any unreasonable or illegal search, regardless of the identity
of the actor. In reaching this decision, the court relied on the wording
of the state search and seizure provision (which does not expressly limit
the scope of the prohibition to state conduct), the transcripts from the
constitutional convention, and earlier Montana decisions in which the
state's courts had excluded evidence obtained from private searches.85
The court found particularly persuasive the comments of the delegate
who had proposed the section. That delegate had argued rather stren-
uously that private searches should not be allowed by the constitution:
Certainly, back in 1776, 1789, when they developed our bill of
rights, the search and seizure provisions were enough, when a
man's home was his castle and the state could not intrude upon
his home without the procuring of a search warrant with prob-
able cause being stated before a magistrate and a search warrant
being issued. No other protection was necessary and this certainly
was the greatest amount of protection that any free society has
given its individuals. In that type of society, of course, the
neighbor was maybe three or four miles away. There was no
real infringement upon the individual and his right of privacy.
However, today we have observed an increasingly complex so-
ciety and we know our area of privacy has decreased, decreased
and decreased . ... 86
Relying upon this statement, the court concluded that the drafters had
intended to proscribe all unreasonable searches, whether conducted by
the state or by private parties. Accordingly, the court held that "[t]he
83. 183 Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979).
84, Mont. Const. art. II, § 10 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or
the person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation reduced to writing.
85. 600 P.2d at at 818.
86. Id. at 818 (quoting VII Tr. Mont. Const. Convention 5180-81).
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right of individual privacy explicitly guaranteed by the State Constitution
is inviolate and the search and seizure provisions of Montana law apply
to private individuals as well as law enforcement officers . *...87
Six years later, in State v. Long,18 the Montana Supreme Court
reversed its position, thereby bringing itself into line with the courts of
the rest of the country. A landlord, after noting a sudden increase in
his utility bills, entered his tenant's home and found 657 marijuana
plants under a "grow light." He then promptly turned the plants over
to the police. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
admission of this evidence violated article II, section 10. Explaining this
result, the court stated, "Unless specifically provided otherwise, citizens'
rights articulated in the Constitution proscribed only state action; there-
fore, if a private citizen invaded the privacy of another citizen, there
was no violation of the Constitution itself."8 9 The court further com-
mented that "[slince we have held that the constitutional rights of the
defendants have not been violated, the reason for applying the exclu-
sionary rule fades." 9 According to the court, the exclusionary rule is
a procedural device used to deter unlawful police activities and to
preserve the integrity of the judiciary itself.9' For this reason, the court
decided that the exclusionary rule was not an appropriate remedy for
private searches. The court, however, pretermitted a consideration of
whether the exclusionary rule should apply to evidence gathered as the
result of felonious conduct. 92 Montana is now aligned with the rest of
the states in holding that the exclusionary rule is not applicable to
private party searches.
Summary
The courts of the overwhelming majority of states have concluded
that their respective state constitutional search and seizure provisions
are coextensive with the fourth amendment, which allows private party
87. Id. at 819.
88. 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
89. Id. at 156.
90. Id. at 157.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 158. Texas has taken this type of approach. Article 38.23 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure provides, "No evidence obtained by an officer or any other
person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or the laws of the State of
Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted
in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case." Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
art. 38.23 (Supp. 1988). This approach has many advantages. Judicial integrity is main-
tained, and private law enforcement officials who have a desire to secure convictions are
deterred. Evidence uncovered by accidental discoveries that do not break the law may be
used. Law enforcement suffers only to the extent other laws are broken. The emphasis
of this approach is on judicial integrity and not the privacy of the individual.
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searches. Although the courts of several states did experiment with their
state search and seizure provisions during the last decade by extending
them to various types of private searches, most have now gone back
to the fourth amendment position. Of those courts, the Supreme Court
of Montana, which at one point declared all private party searches
unconstitutional, is the most interesting example. Thus, with the excep-
tion of those few courts that recognize a distinction for searches con-
ducted by private law enforcement personnel, no state court presently
interprets its state search and seizure provision differently from the
fourth amendment.
RESOLVING THE PRIVATE SEARCH PROBLEM
How should Louisiana treat private party searches? The text of
article 1, section 5, its legislative history, and the jurisprudence inter-
preting it are inconclusive and indeterminate, and other jurisdictions
have for the most part simply followed the federal approach. Thus,
Louisiana's courts must look elsewhere in order to resolve the private
search problem. The courts might proceed by examining the various
purposes that search and seizure provisions and the exclusionary rule
are designed to serve, asking whether these purposes would be advanced
by applying article 1, section 5 to private party searches, and then
balancing any benefits derivable from such an extension of the section
against its costs. On the other hand, the courts might choose to "finesse"
the issue by expanding the definition of "state" activity so that it
embraces the acts of private parties who obtain evidence illegally and
then hand it over to the police. If such acts constituted state action or
could be attributed to the state in some way, then the evidence obtained
would, under traditional search and seizure analysis, have to be excluded.
By embracing this approach, the courts could avoid having to decide
whether private searches as such fall within the ambit of article 1,
section 5. In this section of the paper, both of these options will be
addressed, beginning with the latter.
Finessing the Issue: Attributing Private Conduct to the State
The prevailing view of constitutions is that they are political doc-
uments between peoples and their governments; they are, in this view,
not intended to regulate relationships between private persons. This view
of the nature of constitutions has undoubtedly influenced those courts
which have concluded that their state search and seizure provisions do
not apply in the absence of state action. Even if one accepts this view
of constitutions in general, and of search and seizure provisions in
particular, one is not precluded from holding that evidence obtained
through illegal and unreasonable searches by persons who are apparently
non-governmental actors falls within the scope of those provisions. The
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argument in support of this proposition may take one of two forms.
First, one may argue that ostensibly private conduct which involves the
gathering of evidence is in fact state action. Second, one may admit
that such conduct is not state action in itself, but that state authorities
who use the evidence should be held accountable for the private party's
illegal conduct. These arguments will be presented in more detail below.
The first argument, which has been advanced by several commen-
tators, 93 is that "private" parties who obtain evidence and then turn it
over to the police are state actors because evidence gathering is a "public
function." Knoll Associates, Inc. v. F.TC.94 employed this type of
argument. There a private person stole incriminating evidence from his
employer. While in the employer's office, the employee called the FTC
to volunteer to testify. The court held that the commission "knowingly
gave its approval" to the acts of the private person. "The utilization
of the fruits of the misconduct of Prosser violated the rights of petitioner
protected by the fourth amendment to the federal constitution." 95 When
private persons act in the place of government officials, they arguably
should be held to the same standard of conduct as are government
officials. A person who obtains evidence to use against another is
conducting a governmental function, and for that reason may be con-
sidered an agent of the government. By using the evidence, the gov-
ernment implicitly approves of the agency. Although this agency theory
may be applied to any nongovernmental actor who uncovers evidence,
it seems particularly appealing in those cases that involve private law
enforcement officials; these "private" parties often act for the express
purpose of uncovering evidence of crime.
With the single exception of Knoll, the federal courts, it should be
noted, have steadfastly refused to incorporate the "public function"/
"agency" theory into fourth amendment analysis. The federal position96
is that the fourth amendment does not extend to searches in which there
93. 1 W. Lafave, supra note 6, § 1.6, at 127; Comment, Seizures by Private Parties:
Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 Stan L. Rev. 608, 617 (1967); Burhoff, Not So Private
Searches and the Constitution, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 627, 644 (1981).
94. 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968).
95. Id. at 533. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
96. This also represents the position of the majority of state courts. Staats v. State,
717 P.2d 413 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) is representative. There, a motel employee searched
a hotel room after being notified by another tenant of contraband in the room. The
court rejected the argument that the employee was performing a governmental function
in searching the motel room. According to the court, the employee was acting within the
capacity of an employee and the motel had a legitimate interest in discovering and removing
the contraband, reporting the contraband to the police did not change the nature of the
search.
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is no direct governmental involvement. 97 The mere use of evidence by
the prosecutor is not sufficient state action to invoke the protection of
the fourth amendment. There should be some government participation
in the search for the fourth amendment to apply. 98
The second argument for attributing illegal evidence gathering activity
by private parties to the state rests upon an analogy to the United States
Supreme Court's rejection of the now defunct "silver platter doctrine."
According to that doctrine, evidence seized by state officers in violation
of the fourth amendment could be furnished to federal officers, who
could then use the evidence in federal court free of any taint of illegality.
In Elkins v. United States,99 the United States Supreme Court overturned
the doctrine, holding that the fourth amendment requires the exclusion
of evidence obtained in this manner. The Supreme Court's argument in
Elkins, some commentators and judges have argued, should be extended
to cases in which the state government attempts to use the fruits of
illegal searches conducted by private parties. Just as the federal gov-
ernment becomes implicated in the wrongdoing of state governmental
officials when it uses evidence obtained in illegal searches conducted by
such actors, so the state government becomes implicated in the wrong-
doing of private persons when it was evidence obtained in illegal searches
by those actors.
Although this argument appears plausible on its face, it is in fact
fundamentally flawed. The argument overlooks the fact that the Elkins
court found the silver platter doctrine repugnant only because it allowed
the use of evidence obtained through illegal acts by a government,
namely, state government. According to the Court, "If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.'0 Thus, the
Court's focus was not upon the federal government's action in receiving
97. No case has followed Knoll on this point. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 456, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3032 (1976), the United States Supreme Court distinguished
Knoll and refused to exclude evidence where there was no government participation. OKC
Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Tex. 1978), held that if the government knows
at the time of the occurrence that a private party search was to be conducted, the
government is unconstitutionally involved. The court rejected Knoll which held that after-
the-fact Zovernment approval of a private party search violated the fourth amendment.
In United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976), the seventh circuit limited
Knoll. "[A] mere purpose to assist the Government does not transform an otherwise
private search into a Government search." Very little appears to be left of Knoll. Id. at
271.
98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
99. 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960).
100. Id. at 223, 80 S. Ct. at 1447 (emphasis added).
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and using the illegally obtained evidence, but rather upon the illegal
evidence-gathering activities of state government.' 0' The actions of private
persons in gathering and turning over evidence is fundamentally different
from the state action condemned in Elkins. The state's mere acceptance
of evidence obtained illegally by private parties is not the kind of
governmental action required to claim the protection of the fourth
amendment or any other search and seizure provision.
0 2
Facing the Issue: Evaluating Policies and Balancing Interests
As was demonstrated in the previous subsection, the arguments for
expanding the effective reach of article 1, section 5 by making the state
accountable in some fashion for the illegal acts of private party searches
are unconvincing. Consequently, if Louisiana's courts are to resolve the
private search problem, they must face the issue squarely and decide
whether article 1, section 5 does indeed cover nongovernmental searches.
For reasons that already have been explored, the answer to this question
must be found in considerations of policy. The courts must determine
what policies the section and its exclusionary rule serve and then consider
whether extending the section to private parties would further those
policies and whether the benefits of so extending the section would
outweigh the costs.
Rationales for Search and Seizure Provisions and the Exclusionary
Rule
Privacy
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution was passed
in response to the British use of writs of assistance and general search
warrants. 103 As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Camara
v. Municipal Court,'04 "The basic purpose of this Amendment, as rec-
ognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials."' 15 Thus, although the fourth amendment may be concerned
only with governmental intrusions, it clearly serves the purpose of se-
curing an inviolable "zone of privacy"'' 0 6 for the individual. Extending
101. Id. at 213-14, 80 S. Ct. at 1442. The court cited Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 69 S. Ct. 1359 (1949) for the proposition that the fourth amendment prohibited
unreasonable searches by the states even though the exclusionary rule was not then applied
in state courts.
102. 1 W. Lafave, supra note 6, § 1.6, at 111-12.
103. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-627, 6 S. Ct. 524, 53 (1886).
104. 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
105. Id. at 528, 87 S. Ct. at 1730.
106. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1622 (1976).
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the amendment to private party searches would undoubtedly increase a
person's privacy in some general sense.
Article 1, section 5, like the fourth amendment, also secures indi-
viduals against invasions of their privacy. In debate at the Constitutional
Convention of 1973, Mr. Kendall Visk stated, "The key throughout ...
is every man's home is a castle. ' 10 7 Consequently, any decision con-
cerning the scope of article 1, section 5 must be made with a view to
the probable effects of the decision upon individual privacy that the
section is to ensure.
Some commentators have argued that expanding the scope of the
privacy interest protected by federal and state search and seizure pro-
visions is of critical importance today because of dramatic changes that
have occurred in American society over the last several decades. A
delegate at the Montana Constitutional Convention of 1972 noted that
more and more Americans are living in crowded cities today and, for
that reason, face far more intrusions into their personal lives, both by
governmental officials and private persons, than did Americans just a
few generations ago.108 Further, the development of new technologies
for the gathering of information, technologies that can permit the un-
detected invasion of traditionally private realms such as the house and
automobile by governmental and nongovernmental actors alike, pose
dangers to individual autonomy and dignity that could scarcely have
been imagined by the Founding Fathers.
These considerations, though persuasive, do not justify extending
state search and seizure provisions to private activity. As originally
contemplated, the fourth amendment was not to be applied to private
persons.' °9 Contemporary conditions call for the same interpretation.
While it is true that urbanization has brought with it a loss of privacy,
other recent sociological and economic forces have resulted in a sharp
upturn in the incidence and frequency of crime. Thus the greater in-
dividual interest in maintaining privacy is counterbalanced, at least to
some extent, by the greater necessity of convicting criminals. The cost
of this exclusion would exceed its benefits. Further, although the policy
of protecting privacy would indeed be furthered by extending search
and seizure provisions to private search, further considerations militate
against such an extension."10
Deterrence of Future Misconduct
As was suggested in the previous subsection, the primary, if not
the only, justification for extending article 1, section 5 to private searches
107. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Proceedings, Vol.
VI, Aug. 31, 1973, at 1072.
108. State v. Helfrich, 183 Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979). See supra notes 74-78.
109. See supra note 2.
110. See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
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is to enhance the individual citizen's "right to be let alone." Whether
so extending the section would achieve this end, however, is in large
part a function of the remedies that are available for "enforcing" the
section. At present there is only one such remedy, namely, the exclu-
sionary sanction. Although other remedies could certainly be devised,
for example, an action for a "constitutional tort" against the violator
of article 1, section 5, none of these remedies is currently in place and
there has been no public clamoring to put them into effect. Thus, if
extending article 1, section 5 to private searches is to achieve its intended
effect-securing a greater measure of privacy for the individual-then
the exclusionary section must be capable of bringing about this result.
For reasons that will be presented below, extending article 1, section 5
to private persons and excluding evidence obtained by them in violation
thereof would probably have no perceivable effect upon most classes of
private actors. In other words, the exclusionary sanction, if applied to
the fruits of private searches conducted in violation of article 1, section
5, would, with one limited exception noted below, not deter future
violations of the section.
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule has been described as a
prophylactic rule that is primarily designed to discourage improper and
unconstitutional law enforcement activity."' The same policy underlies
the exclusionary rule that is implicit in article 1, section 5. The rule
functions by removing the incentive for misconduct in the gathering of
evidence. For the rule to be effective, however, the searcher must be
motivated by a desire to secure a criminal conviction and must engage
in searches on a fairly regular basis.
Exclusion of evidence generally does not deter private misconduct.
For the exclusionary rule to be effective, the searcher must engage in
searches on a fairly regular basis." 2 Because a purely private person is
not usually motivated by a desire to secure a conviction, the threat that
evidence uncovered by him in an unreasonable search will be inadmissible
is unlikely to affect his behavior. In those infrequent cases where the
desire to secure a conviction motivates a private person, his lack of law
enforcement training may mean that he is unaware of an exclusionary
rule. Also, accidental discoveries, which account for a great number of
private "searches," can never be prevented. Thus, the exclusionary rule
does not serve a deterrent function when applied to purely private
searches.
On the other hand, exclusion of evidence obtained from searches
by private law enforcement personnel probably would deter their ac-
111. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224, 89 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1969); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
112. Note, supra note 93, at 614-15.
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tions." 3 Such persons are interested in securing convictions for their
employers." 4 A security guard at a department store, for example, is
not satisfied with merely recovering stolen merchandise when he appre-
hends a shoplifter. The merchant, and thus the security guard, is in-
terested in getting professional shoplifters convicted so that others who
may be tempted to shoplift will be discouraged from doing so. Further,
private law enforcement personnel engage in searches on a sufficiently
regular basis to be both affected by and aware of the exclusionary
sanction. If evidence obtained by such personnel was subjected to the
exclusionary rule, companies that employ them would no doubt ensure
that they are properly trained in the constitutional restraints upon searches
and interrogation. Thus, applying the exclusionary rule to private law
enforcement personnel would have a definite effect on methods. Insuring
that such actors show proper respect for citizens' rights would be a
desirable result.
Judicial Integrity
One advocating the extension of article 1, section 5 to private
searches might argue that this extension is necessary to preserve "judicial
integrity." The policy connoted by this expression is that courts should
not be a party to or give their stamp of approval to the conduct of
persons conducting "illegal" searches."' Arguing that the integrity of
the courts is compromised by their use of evidence obtained through
private party searches in violation of article 1, section 5, however, begs
the question. The question here is whether article 1, section 5 ought to
apply to private searches. If private searches are not prohibited by that
section, then the integrity of the courts would not be impaired by the
use of evidence obtained in those searches.
113. This is because of the great numbers of private law enforcement personnel. They
conduct searches on a sufficiently regular basis to be aware of exclusionary rules. Private
security guards outnumber police by 2 to 1, Private Security Advisory Council, A Report
on the Regulation of Private Security Guard Services 1 (1976). $21.7 billion was spent
on private protection in 1980 as compared to $13.8 billion on police protection in 1979.
Private security resources, both expenditures and employment, will continue to increase
as resources for public law enforcement stabilize. Cunningham and Taylor, The Growing
Role of Private Security, Nat'l Inst. Just. Res. in Brief, Oct. 1984.
114. Twenty-four percent of all shoplifting cases are referred to police. R. Griffin,
25th Annual Report, Shoplifting in Supermarkets (1988).
115. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if
it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.




Even if one were to assume that article 1, section 5 applies to private
searches and that the courts' use of evidence obtained in private searches
that violate the section impairs the courts' integrity, the matter would
not be free of difficulty. For one thing, asking if use of the evidence
will impair judicial integrity leaves out an important question, that is,
will resolution of the case without the benefit of generally reliable
evidence impair the court's integrity? The answer is obviously yes. If
so, then the courts face a dilemma regarding how to maintain judicial
integrity. One could argue that the greater threat to judicial integrity
lies in the loss of evidence needed to aid the criminal courts in what
is, in fact, their primary task, determining whether those accused have
committed crimes and bringing the guilty to justice.
Further, and perhaps more importantly, the need to preserve judicial
integrity has been rejected by both federal and state courts as a serious
justification for the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Janis,"6 the
Supreme Court stated,
Judicial integrity does not mean that the courts must never admit
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment....
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context of
evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage
violations of the Constitution. In the Fourth Amendment area,
however, . . . the violation is complete by the time the evidence
reaches court. The focus therefore must be on the question
whether the admission of the evidence encourages the violations
of the Fourth Amendment rights."
7
This reasoning applies with even greater force to the problem of private
searches under article 1, section 5. By using evidence obtained through
unreasonable private searches, searches that would violate article 1,
section 5 if that norm applied to them, the court would not encourage
future violations of the section. Because private parties have no ongoing
stake in gathering evidence on a regular basis, the courts' use of such
evidence would hardly embolden private parties to violate the section
in the future.
For these reasons it is clear that the need to protect the integrity
of the courts does not justify extending article 1, section 5, or its
exclusionary rule, to private searches. As long as the courts do not
"commit or encourage violations of the constitution," judicial integrity
is maintained. By admitting the evidence from a private party search,
the court is not encouraging a violation; the violation has already oc-
curred. Further, admitting the evidence helps to preserve the integrity
of the courts' factfinding function.
116. 428 U.S. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).
117. Id. at 458, 96 S. Ct. at 3034 n.35.
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Balancing the Benefits and Costs of the Rule
Purely Private Persons
In order to determine whether article 1, section 5 should be applied
to private party searches, the court should do more than simply consider
whether this extension would further the policies that underlie the article
and its exclusionary rule. The court should also balance the social benefits
of this extension of the rule against its costs. As has been suggested,
the principle benefit of extending the section is the preservation or
expansion of the individual interest in privacy; the principle detriment
of extending the rule is interference with the government's interest in
detecting and punishing crime.' 8 The benefit-cost balance, it would seem,
will vary depending upon whether the actors in question are purely
private parties or private law enforcement personnel. The discussion
below will be divided accordingly. In the case of a purely private person,
one who is completely unconnected with public or private law enforce-
ment, the cost of excluding the evidence may not be one that society
is ready to pay.' 9 Many criminal prosecutions depend for their success
upon leads and evidence offered by private persons. 20 Furthermore, as
discussed above, the deterrent effect upon private persons of excluding
evidence obtained in violation of article 1, section 5 is questionable. To
eliminate a valuable source of information in exchange for a marginal,
if not completely illusory, increase in security from invasions of privacy
make little sense. The guarantee against unreasonable searches by the
police necessarily limits law enforcement procedures; that is the nature
of the right.' 2' There are, however, no justifiable grounds for extending
the guarantee to the actions of private persons. For these reasons, the
incremental costs of applying article 1, section 5 to purely private persons
are not worth the incremental advantages.
Private Law Enforcement Officials
The benefits and costs of extending the coverage of article 1, section
5 to private law enforcement personnel are somewhat different from
118. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523,
87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967); Pullin v. Louisiana St. Racing Comm'n, 484 So. 2d 105 (La.
1986).
119. The California electorate amended the California Constitution by referendum in
1982 to constrict the exclusionary rule. The actions of private law enforcement officials
are no longer state action in California. Supra note 85. See People v. Geary, 173 Cal.
App. 3d 904, 219 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1985).
120. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1643 (1973); Park,
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163, 231 (1976).
121. 1 W. Lafave, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 23.
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those that would be entailed in extending coverage to purely private
persons. Unlike purely private persons, private law enforcement personnel
would probably be deterred from engaging in unconstitutional searches
and seizures if the exclusionary rule were applied to evidence obtained
by them. Thus, applying the section to such persons would further the
individual interest in privacy. The question, however, is one of cost.
Shoplifting is a major financial problem for retail merchants, 22 and
restricting the use of evidence obtained by security guards can only
increase the problem. 2 1 Clearly, applying the exclusionary rule to such
evidence would have some deleterious effect upon the effective enforce-
ment of the laws. On the other hand, private law enforcement officials
are involved in a government function, and the government licenses and
regulates private law enforcement officials. Actions of police officers
are obviously state action. Actions of undercover and off-duty police
officers are treated as state action despite the appearance of private
action.' 24 The question is whether the line between off duty police officers
and on duty, uniformed, state licensed and regulated security guards is
justifiable. 121
Is the increased cost of applying article 1, section 5 to private
security guards worth the benefit? While the issue is close, the exclu-
122. Losses from crimes against businesses have been estimated from $23.6 billion (for
example, in 1975) to as much as $30 to $40 billion per year. The consumer pays as much
as 1507o higher prices because of shoplifting. M. Caplan & J. Duncan, Retail Security,
A Selected Bibliography (1980) (citing American Management Association, American Man-
agement Association's Crimes Against Business Project- Background, Findings and Re-
commendations (1977)). Shoplifting increased thirty-three percent between 1983 and 1987.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 34 (1987).
The problem is particularly acute in small businesses which have a small profit margin
that shoplifting can quickly destroy, A. Verrill, Reducing Shoplifting Losses, Small Business
Association (1981). Because of the many people who proceed undetected or unreported
these figures are necessarily conservative. An average shoplifting incident in a department
store costs $96, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United
States 152 (1987). See also, S. Sklar, Shoplifting: What You Need to Know About the
Law (1982), for a thorough discussion of the effects of shoplifting and how merchants
seek to prevent it.
123. Eighty-percent of the stores responding to this study used security guards. Over
fifty-percent of the security budget is for the payroll for security personnel. A. Young,
An Ounce of Prevention: The Seventh Annual Survey of Security and Loss Prevention
in the Retail Industry 29, 32 (1987). One study reported that twenty-four percent of
shoplifters apprehended were reported to the police. Of the reported cases, thirty-six
percent were prosecuted. R. Griffin, 25th Annual Report, Shoplifting in Supermarkets 8
(1988). These prosecuted cases could be doomed to failure by the application of a rule
excluding evidence obtained by private security personnel.
124. State v. Wilkerson, 367 So. 2d 319 (La. 1979).
125. The line is made even more obscure as some jurisdictions treat off-duty police
officers as private persons, United States v. McGreevy, 652 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1981).
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sionary rule is probably not the appropriate remedy. 12 6 This proposition
draws support from the fact that the purported benefit of extending
the coverage of the section in this way-securing privacy against un-
reasonable intrusions by private security personnel-can be achieved
through various other legal institutions that do not take such a great
toll upon law enforcement efforts. Statutory regulations, such as the
Private Security Regulatory and Licensing Law, 27 are one example. The
law authorizes the Private Security Examiners Board to adopt regulations
for disciplining security personnel who engage in illegal or otherwise
unreasonable searches. In cases involving severe violations of statutory
regulations, the court may exclude the evidence as in Nelson. In the
event of a violation of any of these regulations, the private law en-
forcement official could be reprimanded, be fined, lose his license, or
even be imprisoned. These sanctions, once put into effect, might have
an even greater deterrent effect on private law enforcement officials
than would excluding the evidence.
In addition to this potential means of securing privacy against un-
reasonable invasions by private security personnel, there are several other
means to this end that are already in place. One is criminal liability.
Many searches that might be considered unreasonable under article 1,
section 5 would also constitute crimes. For example, an unauthorized
search of a customer's purse by a security guard might constitute a
trespass. While prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute persons who pro-
vide them with valuable evidence, the possibility of prosecution has an
undesirable deterrent effect.
Another remedy available to one whose privacy has been invaded
by private security personnel is the private tort action. 28 The very real
threat of a tort action should therefore deter them from engaging in
outrageous conduct in the performance of their duties. Private law
enforcement officials undoubtedly know of the possibility that personal
judgments may be taken against them for tortious invasion of privacy.
The problem with tort actions, however, is that they require both time
and money to bring. In addition, an invasion of privacy may entitle
the victim to only nominal damages.
126. For an equally strong argument that the exclusionary rule should be applied to
private law enforcement personnel, see Burkoff, supra note 93.
127. La. R.S. 37:3270-98 (1988). Although the Private Security Examiners Board cur-
rently has no regulations regarding illegal actions by private security guards, the Board
is authorized to make such rules. La. R.S. 37:3274(B)(1) (1988). This could be a very
effective deterrence. Security guards are required to renew their license once a year. Upon
reissuance, the Board could review the guard's record for violations of search provisions
as prohibited by the Board rules. An aggrieved guard has the right to appeal a decision
by the Board to the courts.




Taken individually, the threats posed by criminal prosecutions, tort
actions, and administrative sanctions may not be sufficient to guarantee
a person's privacy against unreasonable invasions by private law enforce-
ment officials. Considered collectively, on the other hand, these sanctions
do offer a sufficient deterrent to such intrusions. Because these legal
institutions are sufficient for this end, adding the exclusionary rule to the
battery of available sanctions would serve no purpose; any incremental
deterrent effect that might be realized by extending the exclusionary
sanction to the fruits of unreasonable searches by private security guards
would at best be negligible. By the same token, extending the substantive
prohibitions of article 1, section 5 to private security guards would do
little to promote the individual interest in privacy. When one compares
the benefits and costs of extending article 1, section 5 to private law
enforcement officers, one can only conclude that the extension should
not be made.
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Supreme Court should resolve the private search issue
once and for all by holding that private party searches do not fall within
the ambit of article 1, section 5. For reasons that have been identified
by the Louisiana courts of appeal and by the courts of other states, state
constitutional search and seizure provisions, such as article 1, section 5,
require government action. Private searches, even by private law enforce-
ment officials, do not involve state action. The government's use of
evidence obtained from a private search will not transform the search
into state action. Furthermore, policy and a careful balancing of attendant
costs and benefits weigh against extending the section to private searches.
Exclusion of evidence will not deter private persons from conducting
unreasonable searches. As for private law enforcement officials, any ad-
ditional deterrent effect that might be gained by extending the section's
exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through their searches would be
light and not worth the cost to law enforcement. Private law enforcement
officials can be effectively deterred from conducting unreasonable searches
through the threat of administrative sanctions, criminal prosecutions, and
tort actions. In light of the limited benefits and high costs of the extension
of this provision to private party searches, the supreme court should
definitively rule that these searches are not covered. This ruling would
result in more efficient law enforcement, while minimizing intrusions upon
individual privacy.
Connell L. Archey
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